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A KINDLER, GENTLER SUPREME 
COURT?  
THE CASE OF BURNS AND THE 
NEED FOR A PRINCIPLED 





In United States of America v. Burns1 the Supreme Court of Canada 
reconsidered a constitutional issue raised fewer than 10 years previously in two 
cases, Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)2 and Reference Re Ng 
Extradition (Can.).3 All three involved extraditing a fugitive to a known death-
penalty state.  
Extradition of fugitives between Canada and the United States is governed 
by the Extradition Treaty.4 Under this Treaty, one country can refuse to 
extradite fugitives unless it is provided with assurances from the other country 
that they will not seek the death penalty. The constitutional issue that arose in 
these cases was whether or not this assurance must be obtained in Canada by 
virtue of the guarantees set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.5 In Kindler and Ng, the Court allowed extradition without requiring 
________________________________________________________________ 
* Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Thanks to Tracey Rynard for assisting 
with some of the research. 
1
 (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) (“Burns”). 
2
 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (“Kindler”). 
3
 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (“Ng”). 
4
 Extradition Treaty Between Canada and United States of America, Canada and United 
States, 1976, Can. T.S. No. 3. 
5
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereafter the Charter]. 
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an assurance that death would not follow, the majority6 coming to the 
conclusion that neither section 12 nor section 7 of the Charter were offended 
when convicted or alleged criminals were to be extradited to a place where 
death was a possible criminal sanction.7 These decisions both held that, based 
on an appreciation of the nature of the offence and the penalty, the 
considerations of comity and of security between Canada and the U.S. and the 
safeguards and guarantees of the U.S. justice system, there was no Charter 
infringement. According due latitude to the Minister to balance the competing 
interests involved, the Court found that neither case presented Canadians with a 
shocking and fundamentally unacceptable result. In other words, in 1991, there 
was no clear consensus of capital punishment’s moral abhorrence or absolute 
unacceptability. 
Arguably, not much about the barbarism of the death penalty, nor the scope 
of international comity, has changed in this past decade, but the matter was 
nevertheless reheard in Burns. In this latest instalment, a differently-composed 
bench unanimously found it unconstitutional to send someone to another 
country without obtaining assurances that the death penalty would not be 
employed. 
What happened in the intervening years? What about the ancient maxim 
“stare decisis et non quieta movere — stand by the thing decided and do not 
disturb the calm?”8 In Burns, there was not even a dissenting voice asking, 
“what has changed?”9 Welcome to the strange world of precedent, stare decisis 
and overruling in Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has shown a great reluctance in the past to 
overrule its previous decisions. Instead of admitting earlier problems and 
overruling, the Court in these instances almost always engages in hair splitting 
and tortured reasoning in an attempt to distinguish earlier precedents. When it 
________________________________________________________________ 
6
 The Court split 4-3, with La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. for 
the majority. The dissent was further split — Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. deciding that the Minis-
ter’s action offended section 7 of the Charter and Cory J. finding that it offended section 12 of the 
Charter. 
7
 Joseph John Kindler had been convicted of murder in Pennsylvania and escaped while 
awaiting sentencing. Charles Ng was accused of multiple murders in California, but had not faced 
trial.  
8
 See, for example, Rehnquist, “The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare 
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court” (1986), 66 Bos. U. L. Rev. 345, at 347. 
9
 See, for example Kirby J. in dissent in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 
511, at 595. In Wakim the Australian High Court overruled its decision of 12 months’ prior in 
Gould v. Brown (1998) 193 C.L.R. 346, determining that a cross-vesting scheme of judicial cooper-
ation agreed to by all six States and the Commonwealth government was invalid. 
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does overrule, it is usually so dismissive of its own earlier precedent as to lead 
one to wonder whether old cases have any value whatsoever. As such, the 
Court has failed to formulate any general theory of overruling. There is 
therefore a dearth of analysis in Canada on the meaning of overruling and its 
broader and deeper implications. 
Overruling past decisions, particularly constitutional decisions, is an 
important aspect of an evolved legal system. So far, both courts and 
commentators have devoted little time to fully comprehending this issue. Even 
Canada’s pre-eminent constitutional scholar, Dean Peter Hogg, reflects the 
general indifference to this issue in Canada, dispensing with the matter in one 
short paragraph out of his two-volume opus: 
 
It is arguable that in constitutional cases the Court should be more willing to overrule 
prior decisions than in other kinds of cases. In non-constitutional cases, there is 
always a legislative remedy if the doctrine developed by the courts proves to be 
undesirable: the unwanted doctrine can simply be changed by the competent 
legislative body. That is not true of constitutional doctrine, which after its 
establishment by the Court can be altered only by the difficult process of 
constitutional amendment. It follows that there is a greater need for judicial adaptation 
of constitutional law to keep the law abreast of new technology and new social and 
economic needs.10  
 
Understanding a court’s role in overruling prior decisions requires an 
understanding of the roles of precedent and stare decisis in decision-making. 
The next section of this paper briefly explores these concepts.   
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL OVERRULING 
1. The Nature of Precedent and Overruling 
Precedent in law functions as a way to aid human categorization. As noted by 
Henry Monaghan, referring to American constitutional adjudication, it promotes 
“system-wide stability and continuity by ensuring the survival of governmental 
norms.”11 Precedent economizes on information and helps all legal actors 
minimize idiosyncratic conclusions. It thus serves a variety of purposes: it aids in 
________________________________________________________________ 
10
 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1997 release), sec-
tion 8.7, at 8-21 (footnotes omitted). 
11
 Monaghan, “Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication” (1988), 88 Col. L. Rev. 
723, at 749. 
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the stability and coherence of the law, making it more predictable; it provides 
fairness in decision-making; it promotes efficiency and eliminates sources of 
error, such as judicial bias; and it fulfils a symbolic role by recognizing the 
relationship between courts and the legislature. It therefore has independent 
value. 
Precedent in constitutional cases has an even larger role to play. 
Constitutional judgments do not exist in a conceptual vacuum, nor can they be 
restricted to a limited sphere of influence encompassing the parties to a dispute. 
As Canada’s constitutional arbiter, the Supreme Court’s function is to settle 
disputes stemming from differing readings of the Constitution. Each 
constitutional precedent also defines how the nation is governed. Constitutional 
cases have indirect impacts often far greater than those on the immediate 
participants. The Supreme Court plays, in its role as an adjudicator, a 
contributing role in the organization and regulation of government and society. 
The Court must therefore be aware of the potential havoc that can occur once it 
overrules a previous decision. 
This means that in constitutional cases the arguments for having an even 
more rational basis for overruling are compelling. For one, the effects are more 
permanent than in ordinary litigation. Where Parliament disagrees with a 
court’s constitutional decisions, it has few options: in some Charter cases, it can 
use the override in section 33; it can commence the process to amend the 
Constitution; or it can litigate a fresh case in which the principle of stare decisis 
will be ignored. This gives the Supreme Court great potential power and control 
over fundamental issues related to society. While overruling non-constitutional 
precedents is of course not without its dangers, it is only in constitutional 
reconsiderations that decisions must be weighed against a loyalty to the organic 
law of the Constitution.12 
Given the importance of constitutional overruling and the unique set of 
competing concerns, it is surprising that there is a lack of detailed focus on it. 
Overruling constitutional decisions is not something to be treated as simply 
part of the process of judicial decision-making. It is fundamentally different. 
For this reason there is a need to examine the conceptual and procedural 
issues most pertinent, or exclusive, to overruling constitutional decisions. 
________________________________________________________________ 
12
 See the language of Isaacs J. in Australian Agricultural Co v. Federated Engine-Drivers 
and Firemen’s Association of Australasia (1913) 17 C.L.R. 261, at 278. Chief Justice Rehnquist of 
the United States Supreme Court has argued that as there are fewer reliance interests which would 
be affected in constitutional adjudication, constitutional decisions should be given less weight in 
contrast with property and contractual law precedents (see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, at 
2610 (1991)). 
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When it is appropriate, a court should not hesitate to overrule, swiftly and 
decisively. At the same time, courts must be reluctant to overrule without 
compelling reasons. Such hesitancy is simply pragmatic. Overruling 
constitutional cases should not be employed as a way around constitutional 
amendment — a process made expressly difficult in most countries in order 
to promote stability in governmental arrangements.13 Eliminating stare decisis 
from constitutional adjudication also endangers the stability of the law, as 
legislation and executive action are often reliant on prior constitutional decisions. 
In Canada, previous Supreme Court decisions can have a huge influence on 
governmental policy to initiate legislative or executive action in sensitive areas of 
social policy. It was this very situation faced by Minister Rock in Burns. 
2. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Overruling  
The few cases where the Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of overruling 
lack coherence. First, there is an initial presumption that the Court should not 
easily overrule its prior judgments. But there is no discussion in the case law as to 
whether constitutional cases should be treated differently from non-constitutional 
cases. Some recent examples of this jurisprudence include Clark v. Canadian 
National Railway Co.,14 Dickson C.J.C.’s dissenting ruling in R. v. Bernard15 (the 
other justices did not disagree with him on this point), Lamer C.J.C.’s majority 
decision in R. v. Chaulk,16 and R. v. B. (K.G.)17 and Wilson J.’s majority decision 
in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission).18 
In Clark, the Court was deciding whether or not to apply a precedent established 
in Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Pszenicnzy.19 That precedent relied on the 
constitutional validity of a provision of the Railway Act which altered the 
common law duty of care for railways. The Court in Clark determined that the 
prior precedent should be overruled, but paid scant attention to the mechanics 
of overruling. It noted that one reason for maintaining a precedent was whether 
a point was fully argued. Courts should be less willing to interfere with a 
________________________________________________________________ 
13
 For an overview of this debate in Australia, see Blackshield & Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials, 2nd ed (Annandale, N.S.W.: Federa-
tion Press, 1998), at chapter 28. For this argument in the U.S. context, see Easterbrook, “Stability 
and Reliability in Judicial Decisionmaking” (1988), 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422, at 430. 
14
 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680 (“Clark”). 
15
 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 (“Bernard”). 
16
 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (see especially at 1353). 
17
 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (“B. (K.G.)”). 
18
 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 (“Central Alberta Dairy Pool”). 
19
 (1916), 54 S.C.R. 36 (“Pszenicnzy”). 
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decision arrived at after full argument and deliberation. Changed circumstances 
were cited as another reason the Court could overrule: the formative nature of 
Canada’s railway at the time of Pszenicnzy was not, in 1988, a reason for the 
railway to benefit from a relaxed legal rule.  
The methodology developed in Clark has been further refined. The gist of 
the Court’s current approach to overruling is contained in Dickson C.J.C.’s 
dissenting statement in Bernard: 
 
Let me say immediately that, even if a case were wrongly decided, certainty in the 
law remains an important consideration. There must be compelling circumstances 
to justify departure from a prior decision. On the other hand, it is clear that this 
Court may overrule its own decisions and indeed, it has exercised that discretion on 
a number of occasions.20 
 
A majority of the Court affirmed this approach in B. (K.G.), adopting Dickson 
C.J.C.’s four-factor test from Bernard. The factors that should be reviewed in order 
to support a decision to overrule an earlier judgment can be stated as follows: 
 
(1) Is variation required in order to avoid a Charter breach? 
(2) Has the rule or principle been attenuated or undermined by other 
decisions of the Supreme Court or other appellate courts? 
(3) Has the rule or principle created uncertainty or become “unduly and 
unnecessarily complex and technical”? 
(4) Does the proposed change in the rule or principle broaden the scope of 
criminal liability, or is it otherwise unfavourable to the position of the 
accused? (The same argument does not apply, however, where the result 
of overruling a prior decision is to establish a rule favourable to the 
accused.)21 
 
The above factors do not provide a comprehensive list, nor must they all be 
present in a particular case to justify overruling a prior decision. They are to be 
used as guidelines to assist the Court in exercising its discretion. They do, 
________________________________________________________________ 
20
 Bernard, supra, note 15, at 849. 
21
 B. (K.G.) supra, note 17, at 778. In John v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 
166 C.L.R. 417 the Australian High Court derived a four-factor test which is more theoretically 
sound. There, the High Court is required to ask: (1) Do the earlier decisions rest upon a principle 
that is worked out in successive cases? (2) Is there a difference in reasoning between the majority 
justices in one of the earlier decisions? (3) Has the earlier decision not achieved a useful result, but 
rather caused considerable inconvenience? and (4) Have the earlier decisions been acted upon in 
such a manner as to militate against reconsidering? 
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however, represent an attempt to balance, on one hand, the reason for 
maintaining a system of precedent, and on the other, the search for truth. 
In B. (K.G.), the Court concluded that it should do nothing other than what it 
thinks best in reconsidering whether an existing rule of evidence should be 
overturned. Reviewing the four factors, the Court found (most importantly) that 
reform of the rule was necessary to avoid breaching the Charter; the old rule 
had been weakened by other developments in the law of hearsay and is 
somewhat, if not overly, technical; and reforming the rule would not directly 
expand the scope of criminal liability. 
In R. v. Robinson,22 Lamer C.J.C., on behalf of the majority, concluded that it 
was time to overrule the Beard rules (evidentiary rules related to intoxication 
and diminished capacity). This time, the Court gave five reasons for overruling:  
 
(1)  strong dissenting opinions of the two previous chief justices Laskin and 
Dickson in a series of cases involving the application of the rules;  
(2) the fact that none of the provincial appellate courts considering the issue 
in the last few years had followed the Beard rules;  
(3) there had been similar developments in England, New Zealand and 
Australia;  
(4) a large body of academic commentary in Canada favoured abandoning 
the Beard rules; and  
(5) the Beard rules are inconsistent with the Charter as they create a form of 
constructive liability.  
 
Although the majority does not relate these explicitly to the factors developed 
in B. (K.G.), there is some attempt at consistency as the first three reasons could 
be equated directly with the second factor, the fourth reason indirectly relates to 
the third factor, and the fifth is equivalent to the first factor.  
In contrast to these cases where the Court tries to follow a principled 
approach to overruling, however, are examples of what I call bare overruling. 
The worst example is found in Central Alberta Dairy Pool where the Court was 
faced with conflicting lines of authority about a bona fide occupational 
requirement (BFOR) in human rights jurisprudence. While very forthcoming 
about some of its previous decisions on this topic,23 the Court failed to address 
________________________________________________________________ 
22
 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683 (“Robinson”). 
23
 Wilson J. on behalf of the majority stating, “It seems to me in retrospect that the majori-
ty of this Court may indeed have erred in concluding that the hard hat rule [established in the case 
Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561] was a BFOR” (Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool, supra, note 18, at 512). 
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the role of precedent in law or apply any of its overruling factors. Instead, two 
reasons were cited for the Court’s previous incorrect approach, both related to 
the substance of the Bhinder decision itself. This meant, however, that the 
Court never engaged in the balancing approach set out in B. (K.G.) between the 
correctness of a decision and its value as precedent. 
While the Supreme Court’s four-factor approach is to be commended as 
fashioning the beginnings of a Canadian theory of constitutional overruling, there 
is still some way to go. Missing from the guidelines in B. (K.G.) are elements that 
relate to the foundational values of precedent. An improved version of an overruling 
theory would, at a minimum, take into account public support and reliance, and 
inconvenience. 
Both public and governmental support, or lack thereof, should be examined 
when a court reconsiders a decision. The Australian High Court has established 
this as an overruling factor. In Commonwealth v. Hospital Contribution Fund of 
Australia Wilson J. recognized that the fact that the precedents had been 
decided “in the face of united opposition from both the Commonwealth and 
State Governments,” in conjunction with other factors, placed them in a 
“special category.”24 In Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, Kirby J. emphasized that 
the collective voice of all the governments and Parliaments of the nation had 
been heard, in harmony, to urge that the “constitutional status quo, achieved 
after the Court’s earlier decision, be maintained.”25 
Public approval should be seen as a necessary step in determining whether to 
overrule a previous case. A proper consideration of the place to be given for 
public approval in a precedent does not mean a court is abdicating its duty to 
decide upon the correctness of a particular authority. Assessing public opinion 
allows a court to take into account practical views of the potential 
consequences of upholding or departing from a prior decision. This, of course, 
cuts both ways. After all, a government may support a decision which, if 
overruled, would create great inconvenience to its administration but which 
would relieve citizens, or other institutional bodies, of an inappropriate burden. 
Where a court finds unanimous support for a particular option, however, as was 
the case with all levels of government in Re Wakim, it should not dismiss the 
potential for inconvenience caused by overturning a previously accepted 
scheme. 
If a court is not averse to examining public support in its reconsiderations, it 
should at the same time be aware of the difficulty of ascertaining what level of 
________________________________________________________________ 
24
 (1982) 150 C.L.R. 49, at 72. 
25
 See Re Wakim, supra, note 9, at 598-99.  
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approval exists. Moreover, it needs to be aware of the tightrope it must walk to 
assess whether such a level is sufficient to warrant an overruling or upholding. 
Simply paying lip service to public approval as a factor in the overruling equation 
is not sufficient. At the very least, appropriate economic and sociological 
evidence must be assessed. 
Harlan J., of the United States Supreme Court, explained that adherence to 
precedent is supported by “the necessity of maintaining public faith in the 
judiciary.”26 Judges in constitutional courts must not easily dismiss the effect 
that overruling a prior case may have on both perception and reliance. 
Acknowledging the effect that a court’s attitude to stare decisis has on public 
confidence, however, is not the same as arguing that it should take this into 
account in reconsidering constitutional cases. Respect for precedents is said to 
support the worthwhile belief that all organs of governments are bound by the 
law.27 In Canada the Supreme Court plays an integral part in the governance of 
the nation by sitting as the peak, and often sole, constitutional umpire. The fact 
that changes in its public standing cannot generally affect its work does not 
mean that maintaining public faith in its processes is not a worthwhile aim. 
Ensuring stability and confidence in our constitutional system goes hand in 
hand with maintaining a functioning democracy. That is one reason why the 
doctrine of precedent performs symbolic functions in relation to the 
constitutional and political interaction between the courts and the legislature.28 
The Court should, therefore, be concerned with the effect its actions have on 
its public standing, but not in the way that is perhaps most obvious. The Court’s 
concern must be with the effect the process it undertakes would have on public 
opinion, not with the particular conclusions it reaches. Once the Court is 
satisfied that the process of overruling has taken into account all legitimate 
considerations, the Court should be indifferent to the effect on public opinion a 
resulting choice would have. There is a marked difference between a proper 
overruling of a widely supported decision and an improper overruling of a 
widely criticized precedent. The former may generate immediate negative 
reaction, but would in the long term confirm the integrity of the Court’s 
approach to constitutional adjudication. The latter may momentarily satisfy 
public opinion, but ultimately detracts from public confidence in the Court’s 
processes and sets unacceptable standards for future reconsiderations. While it 
________________________________________________________________ 
26
 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 US 375, at 403 (1970). 
27
 See, for example, “Constitutional Stare Decisis” (1990), 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1344, at 
1350 (unattributed). 
28
 See Twining & Miers, How to Do Things with Rules, 2nd ed. (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1982), especially at 275. 
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can appear perverse for a court to adhere to decisions which it finds depart from 
the law,29 the need to do so is a practical reflection of the fact that the Court 
decides whether to overrule against a backdrop of constitutional arrangements 
shaped by the Court’s own prior pronouncements. 
Similar reasons suggest that inconvenience is another factor worth 
considering before overruling. Inconvenience applies both to the consequences 
of altering decisions that are widely approved of and the effects of refusing to 
overrule a decision that is widely condemned. In Australia, for example, Re 
Wakim invalidated a significant scheme of cooperative legislation that had been 
upheld by the same Court one year previously in Gould v. Brown.30 Although 
Parliament did not rely on a judicial precedent in first enacting the legislative 
scheme, great inconvenience still flowed when the Court disregarded Gould 
one year later.   
Refusing to recognize inconvenience as a factor results in making 
adjudication inappropriately inflexible. The Privy Council’s time as Canada’s 
final constitutional court provides an apt, if extreme, example. It repeatedly refused 
to depart from its previous constitutional decisions,31 completely disregarding the 
often great inconvenience that resulted. As a result Canadian legislatures made 
frequent attempts to avoid the consequences of inopportune constitutional 
authorities.32 If the Privy Council had placed any emphasis at all on the protests of 
the legislatures, a different approach may have been taken. 
Failing to address this thorny issue of overruling and precedent as it arose in 
Burns is the Supreme Court’s latest missed opportunity. 
III. THE CASE OF GLEN BURNS AND ATIF RAFAY 
1. The Decision 
Glen Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay are Canadian high school 
friends. In July 1994, Rafay’s father, mother and sister were found bludgeoned 
to death in their home in Bellevue, Washington. The Bellevue police suspected 
both Burns and Rafay but did not have enough evidence to charge them. They 
both returned to Canada where, after additional evidence was obtained, they 
________________________________________________________________ 
29
 See Monaghan, supra, note 11, at 752. 
30
 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511; Gould v. Brown (1998) 193 
C.L.R. 346. 
31
 See, e.g., Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 
193, especially at 206. 
32
 See Laskin, “The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians” 
(1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1038, at 1070. 
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were eventually arrested and a committal order issued for their extradition 
pending the Minister of Justice’s decision. 
Burns and Rafay, if convicted in Washington, will face either life in prison, 
without the possibility of parole, or the death penalty. Under the old Extradition 
Act,33 which applies to Burns and Rafay, the Justice Minister has to determine 
whether or not to surrender fugitives, and if so on what terms. In this case, the 
then Minister, Allan Rock, proceeded on the assumption that the death penalty 
would be sought by the prosecutors in the state of Washington. He signed an 
unconditional Order for Surrender to have them both extradited to the state of 
Washington to stand trial without assurances in respect of the death penalty. 
The case that came before the Supreme Court of Canada, after the Minister’s 
determination and a subsequent appeal at the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, was whether the two should be extradited to Washington in the face of 
this possible death sentence. The main arguments relied on by both Burns and 
Rafay was that the Minister is required by sections 6(1), 7 and 12 of the Charter 
to seek assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. They argued 
that their unconditional extradition to face the death penalty would “shock the 
Canadian conscience” because of their age (18 years at the time of the offence) 
and the fact that, unlike Kindler or Ng, they were Canadian.34 Despite this 
minor factual difference, they seemed to run up directly against the precedents 
set in Kindler and Ng. 
Interestingly, it was the doctrine of precedent that forced the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in Burns to find a new argument. Because of 
Kindler and Ng, sections 7 and 12 of the Charter were largely out of play. So, 
the Court of Appeal found a new Charter provision — section 6(1) mobility 
rights — which allowed it to set aside the Minister’s decision and direct him to 
seek Article 6 assurances.35 The majority of the Court of Appeal noted that if 
Burns and Rafay are put to death in the state of Washington, they will no longer 
be able to exercise a right of return under section 6(1) of the Charter. It was 
this, in combination with their Canadian citizenship, which allowed Donald 
J.A. (with whom McEachern C.J.B.C. concurred) to find a way to distinguish 
Kindler. To him, it was obvious that the Kindler analysis did not apply to 
Canadian citizens facing the death penalty because the “government, in the 
person of the Minister, has an obligation not to force citizens out of the country 
________________________________________________________________ 
33
 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-23. 
34
  United States of America v. Burns (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 14 (S.C.C.). 
35
 See United States of America v. Burns (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 524 (B.C.C.A.); Article 
6 of Extradition Treaty Between Canada and United States of America, Canada and United States, 
1976, Can. T.S. No. 3. 
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with the jeopardy of never returning” and that Canadian citizens must be able to 
consider their own country a safe haven and “access to … constitutional 
protections … a feature of citizenship.”36 As even convicted criminals on death 
row have a faint hope of returning to their country, the Court of Appeal found 
that the Minister breached section 6(1) of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court held that using mobility rights to cover the death penalty 
controversy was misplaced. It was too remote to contemplate the possibility of 
legislative change or other exceptional relief in a foreign jurisdiction. It was 
also too remote considering that the death penalty may not be imposed. Neither 
point was a plausible argument for the right of return to country. The main 
issue was one of fundamental justice.37 
It was thus section 7 on which the Court focused. In doing so, the Court 
returned to the main analysis made under Kindler, except this time it was much 
kinder to the fugitives — assurances in death penalty cases must now be sought 
under our Charter.  
The analytical approach set out in Kindler and Ng remains the starting point. 
In neither of those cases, the Court argues, was blanket approval given to 
extraditions which could lead to death. Instead, the approach requires balancing 
between the global context and the possibility that circumstances may 
constitutionally vitiate an order for surrender without assurances. A number of 
factors are at play in this process, including the mental condition of a fugitive 
and the difficulties (practical and philosophic) associated with the death 
penalty. Under this analysis each case will need to be decided on its merits; 
however, unless significant strides are made to humanize and dignify state-
sanctioned death, it seems unlikely that a Minister could constitutionally 
extradite without now seeking assurances. As the Burns Court noted, “in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, which we refrain from trying to anticipate, 
assurances in death penalty cases are always constitutionally required.”38 
This is somewhat strange. The Court affirms the balancing process set out in 
Kindler and Ng, but indicates that now, the balance is almost always tipped in 
favour of preserving the life of an accused. The ultimate assessment is still 
whether the extradition is in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice, but given the latest knowledge of the problems surrounding use of the 
death penalty, it is now a straightforward exercise. The lower courts had 
mistakenly thought that Kindler required a finding that shocks the conscience 
________________________________________________________________ 
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before a Minister must seek assurances. As stated by the Court in Burns, 
“shocking the conscience” simply alludes to the exceptional nature of 
circumstances that would constitutionally limit the Minister’s decision in 
extradition cases. According to the Court, the balancing is still there — it is 
simply that the death penalty has gone from an unexceptional act in Kindler to 
one that is now exceptional. In formulating their reasons, the Court makes three 
arguments as to why a decade should make a difference. 
(a) Abolition Is on the Rise 
A large portion of the judgment details the changes that have supposedly 
occurred in death penalty jurisprudence in a number of locations including 
Canada, the United States and Europe. Evidence is presented showing the ever-
increasing global abhorrence to the death penalty. In Canada, for example, 
when Ng and Kindler challenged their extradition, it was still possible to be 
executed for certain military offences. This was abolished in 1998, seven years 
after Kindler and Ng were decided.39  
Other facts establish the new-found acceptability of abolition. In 1948, only 
eight countries had abolished the death penalty. In 1998, there were 102 
abolitionist countries — 61 were totally abolitionist, 14 abolitionist in part and 
27 de facto abolitionist (no executions for the past 10 years). Only 90 countries 
retained the death penalty. Abolitionist states include all of the major 
democracies except parts of the United States, India and Japan. Eighty-five 
percent of the world’s executions in 1999 were conducted by only five 
countries: the United States, China, the Congo, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
But statistics only reveal the picture that you want them to. Canada has not, 
for example, ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which calls for abolition of the death 
penalty.40 As well, although a number of countries have added their signatures 
to international documents calling for abolition since Kindler and Ng were 
extradited, it was not as if there were only a few abolitionist voices in the 
wilderness in 1991. Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. in their dissent in Kindler 
listed over 60 countries attesting to the concern in 1991. 
The Court in Burns also ignored the fact that retentionist states account for a 
large portion of the world’s population (China, India and the United States 
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(1989), entered into force July 11, 1991. This point was noted by the Court in Burns — see supra, 
note 34, at 39. 
152 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
1st proofs  Date:Friday, February 10, 2012 
themselves constituting over 40% of the world’s approximately 6 billion 
people). It never explained how fundamental justice (which by its nature seems 
to decry statistical analysis) is affected by a “counting of heads” approach. An 
honest use of statistical evidence should deal with all the facts, both helpful and 
contrary. 
(b) More Wrongful Convictions 
While the Court acknowledges that potential miscarriage of justice has 
always been a valid objection to the death penalty, it also notes that knowledge 
of the extent of this problem since Kindler and Ng were decided has grown to 
“unanticipated and unprecedented proportions.”41 The Court cites a number of 
examples in Canada, including the cases of Donald Marshall, David Milgaard, 
Guy Paul Morin, Thomas Sophonow and Gregory Parsons. Oddly enough, it is 
Marshall’s case that is probably foremost in the Court’s mind, yet the Court 
admits that the miscarriage of justice in his case was known at the time Kindler 
and Ng were decided. Of course, the mounting number of wrongful convictions 
do help to establish a possible pattern. 
The Court also relies on a recent study by Professor James Liebman which 
convincingly details the extent of this problem in the United States. The study 
concluded that two out of three death penalty sentences in the United States were 
reversed on appeal, that the overall rate of prejudicial error in the American 
capital punishment system was 68%, and that between 1972 and the beginning 
of 1998, 68 people were released from death row on the grounds that their 
convictions were faulty.42 As Professor Liebman began collecting data on 
capital cases the year that Kindler and Ng were decided, the Court used it to 
further advance its claim of changed circumstances. 
Again, citing statistics belies the truth. It is in fact not true that the rate of 
wrongful convictions in murder cases is rising, although the Court does not 
clearly note this. Rather, procedures and safeguards are better now than they 
have ever been, and the recent use of DNA evidence is likely to aid in 
curtailing further wrongful convictions. What is increasing is the use of DNA 
and other methods to unearth past mistakes. In addition, the Court plays a 
slippery game here, by relying on current statistics about past wrongs to 
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establish future trends. The evidence establishing current statistics is evidence 
that was unavailable at the time most of the crimes in the Liebman study were 
committed. If, as the Court prescribes, a case-by-case approach is necessary, it 
is much more likely that in Burns’ and Rafay’s case, any DNA evidence will be 
available for use at trial. DNA science exists now to aid in establishing guilt for 
crimes committed in 1994, not only as a source for unearthing past wrongs. 
Furthermore, how valid to Burns and Rafay are statistics of wrongful 
convictions in Canada or in other U.S. states? In the United States, criminal law 
is a state matter. In fact, one of the main reasons why a democracy such as the 
U.S. is the world’s largest capital punishment state is that it is up to each state 
to determine sentencing policy — making it politically palatable for many to 
pass retentionist laws. This should have made the Supreme Court examine 
more carefully the state of Washington’s record with wrongful convictions. 
According to the Liebman study, Washington is below average for combined 
error rates in convictions. It has also carried out only two executions out of 40 
death sentences, in the 18 years studied. Statistics are helpful, but if a case-by-
case analysis is the new standard, a more penetrating analysis of the particular 
state is required.43 
(c) A Better Understanding of the Death Row Phenomenon 
The “death row phenomenon” is experienced by inmates on death row who 
find that procedural safeguards causing lengthy delays bring about associated 
psychological trauma. This argument, effectively dismissed in Kindler, was 
given greater prominence in Burns, albeit held to be of limited weight.44 The 
Court referred to a report of Chief Justice Guy of Washington State, which 
found sufficient proof of this phenomenon. Reference is also made to a similar 
observation made well before Kindler’s case in 1991 — this time to a 
dissenting Frankfurter J. of the United States Supreme Court in Solesbee v. 
Balkcom45 in 1950! 
________________________________________________________________ 
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2. Death Penalty Jurisprudence and Burns 
In some ways, the arbitrariness of life worked against Joseph Kindler and 
Charles Ng. After finding section 7 of the Charter was breached for Glen Burns 
and Atif Rafay because of these three changes since Kindler and Ng, it was a 
short step for the Court to find that the main government justification under 
section 1 — ensuring Canada does not become a safe haven for criminals — is 
also now out of date. No evidence was tendered showing that extradition from 
Canada with assurances would act as an incentive to American fugitives to 
come here. Instead, the Court held that so-called safe havens exist as a matter 
of simple geographical determinism (American fugitives choose Canada 
because we are neighbours), or logic (poor law enforcement is an incentive, not 
the leniency of ultimate sentence).46 
In the end, the Court reasons that concerns over implementation of capital 
punishment, some of which pre-dated Kindler and Ng, have, in the intervening 
years, grown greatly in scope and degree of proof. But none of this should have 
come as a surprise.  
In its first paragraph the Court already tips its hand. It is worth quoting in its 
entirety: 
 
Legal systems have to live with the possibility of error. The unique feature of 
capital punishment is that it puts beyond recall the possibility of correction. In 
recent years, aided by the advances in the forensic sciences, including DNA testing, 
the courts and governments in this country and elsewhere have come to 
acknowledge a number of instances of wrongful convictions for murder despite all 
of the careful safeguards put in place for the protection of the innocent. The 
instances in Canada are few, but if capital punishment had been carried out, the 
result could have been the killing by the government of innocent individuals. The 
names of Marshall, Milgaard, Morin, Sophonow and Parsons signal prudence and 
caution in a murder case. Other countries have also experienced revelations of 
wrongful convictions, including states of the United States where the death penalty 
is still imposed and carried into execution.47 
 
Does this suggest that our post-modern world has finally shown us the truth 
about institutional fallibility? The Court returns to this theme, recognizing that 
“despite the best efforts of all concerned, the judicial system is and will remain 
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fallible and reversible whereas the death penalty will forever remain final and 
irreversible.”48 Is it really groundbreaking news? 
To our highest court it is. Ten years after Kindler was sent by Canada to face 
his death in the state of Pennsylvania, the Court finds that the world has 
changed so much that Burns and Rafay must not face the death penalty in the 
state of Washington in 2001. To me, it is an unfortunate consequence of our 
doctrine of precedent, and reluctance to overrule, that led the Court to embark 
on this rather strange rhetorical journey.49 
One of the most poetic legal accounts of the horrors of capital punishment is 
to be found in Callins v. Collins50 where Justice Blackmun, in dissent, discusses 
his own overturning of views he previously held. The language soars: 
 
On February 23, 1994, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Bruce Edwin Callins will be 
executed by the State of Texas. Intravenous tubes attached to his arms will carry 
the instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifically for the purpose of killing 
human beings. The witnesses, standing a few feet away, will behold Callins, no 
longer a defendant, an appellant, or a petitioner, but a man, strapped to a gurney, 
and seconds away from extinction. 
 
Within days, or perhaps hours, the memory of Callins will begin to fade. The 
wheels of justice will churn again, and somewhere, another jury or another judge 
will have the unenviable task of determining whether some human being is to live 
or die …  
 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For 
more than 20 years, I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a 
majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend 
more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather 
than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has 
been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and 
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has 
failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules 
________________________________________________________________ 
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or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent 
constitutional deficiencies. The basic question—does the system accurately and 
consistently determine which defendants “deserve” to die?—cannot be answered in 
the affirmative. … The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral 
error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system 
that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by 
the Constitution.51  
 
I should state that I do not believe in capital punishment. I also believe that 
courts have a huge role to play in setting the tone of this debate. So what about 
the case of Burns? Its ultimate finding is profound for anyone opposed to death 
sentences. But why did the Supreme Court not simply overrule its earlier duo of 
Kindler and Ng? By trying to create the appearance of a new era in death 
penalty jurisprudence through the marshalling of tendentious facts, the Court 
seems to me to skirt the real problem. It should have, as Justice Blackmun did, 
bitten the bullet and admitted that it was wrong the first time around, and 
overruled itself. 
Instead, it chose to rely on the age-old judicial technique of distinguishing. 
In fact, the Court did not even allude to the possibility of overruling the two 
previous cases of Kindler and Ng. It is possible that it was hampered from 
doing this by its own overruling factors established in B. (K.G.) and Robinson. 
None are very appropriate to this case. The first factor — whether the need 
exists to change the old precedent in order to avoid a Charter breach — makes 
much more sense in dealing with precedents that had been established prior to 
the Charter. The second and third factors are also largely inapplicable. And as 
the proposed change in the rule or principle is favourable to the accused, the 
fourth factor does not come into play either. 
On the other hand, an approach to overruling that drew upon a deeper 
understanding of the role of precedent and stare decisis could have made it 
easier for the Court to produce a different result. For example, in deciding 
whether to overrule, the Court could have looked at whether the earlier 
decisions rest upon a principle that is fully worked out in successive cases. If 
not, overruling is simpler. In the case of Burns, there was no long line of 
authority related to extradition and death penalty assurances. By its very nature, 
it is not the kind of case that will crop up very often in Canada. This makes it 
much easier for the Court to decide that its original determination was 
incorrect, and should be overruled. The Court could also have assessed whether 
earlier decisions have been relied upon so as to militate against reconsidering. 
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In an extradition case such as this, it would be stretching argument to find much 
individual reliance. The federal government could conceivably have relied on 
the Kindler and Ng principle to extradite other fugitives who may have been 
subject to the death penalty; however, the number of cases is limited, and each 
must be decided individually by the Minister.52 Where the reliance interest is 
low, there is less importance placed on stability as a value served by precedent. 
Commenting on the death of stare decisis in constitutional law, American 
law professor Earl Maltz lamented the “relatively little attention paid to the 
problems generated by the process of change itself.”53 The Supreme Court of 
Canada has sometimes paid little attention to implications that arise when 
departing from any previous decision. It certainly has not come up with a 
specialized theory to guide the overturning of previous constitutional decisions. 
If only the Supreme Court had had the courage in Burns to admit its earlier 
errors, its eloquence may have climbed as high as Justice Blackmun’s in 
Callins. Championing abolition of the death penalty deserves no less. 
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